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WORK PRODUCT IN THE FEDERAL
DISCOVERY PROCEDURE
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, information in the
hands of an adverse party may be obtained by depositions, interroga-
tories, or production of documents." Of particular significance is Rule
26 which determines the scope of discovery permissable under these
devices. This rule provides that a deponent may be examined regard-
ing any matter not privileged, which is relevant to the issues involved
in the pending action. It expressly states the matter need not be admis-
sable at the trial if it's reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissable evidence.
In Hickman v. Taylor,2 the United States Supreme Court laid down
a broad rule in regard to obtaining information from the opponent's
files under the wide scope stated in Rule 26. In that case the court
labeled as a lawyer's "work product" his preparation for trial as re-
flected in memoranda, interviews, statements, correspondence, mental
impressions, personal beliefs, and in many other tangible and intangible
ways, and held that the general policy against invading the privacy of
an attorney, in his preparation for trial, was so strong and well recog-
nized and essential to an orderly working of our system of legal pro-
cedure, that this work product was not, without more, subject to dis-
covery and that a burden rests on one who would invade an attorney's
privacy to establish adequate reasons to justify production of this work
product.
In the interpretation and application of the Hickman rule several
principles have developed. First, to be within the classification of work
product the requested matter must have been gathered in preparation
for trial or at least in anticipation of litigation. 3 Likewise it must have
resulted from the attorney's legal skill and talent.4 For this latter rea-
l Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, 33, 34.
2Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
3Royal Exchange Assur. v. McGrath, 13 F.R.D. 150, (S.D. N.Y. 1952); Park
& Tilford Distillers Corporation v. United States of America, 20 F.R.D. 404(S.D. N.Y. 1957); Rediker v. Warfield, 11 F.R.D. 125 (S.D. N.Y. 1951);
McManus v. Harkness, 11 F.R.D. 402 (S.D. N.Y. 1951); Tobacco and Allied
Stocks v. Transamerica Corp., 16 F.R.D. 534 (D. Del. 1954); Snyder v.
United States, 20 F.R.D. 7 (E.D. N.Y. 1956) "For purposes of rule protect-
ing, from compulsory disclosure to adversary, the work product of an attor-
ney, a distinction should be made between airplane accident investigations
made for purposes of improving flight safety and those made for purpose of
acquiring information for use in connection with claims or litigation against
government."
4United States v. Deere and Company, 9 F.R.D. 523 (D. Minn. 1949) ; United
States v. Certain Parcels of Land Etc., 15 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. Cal. 1953) report
herein involved concerned only factual information.
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son photos taken by the attorney usually will not be work product,5
but diagrams and drawings might well be as they illustrate the coun-
sel's notion of the accidentA
The work product doctrine does not apply to information sought
as to whether there is such work product, but only to the information,
if any, contained therein.7
The work product of an attorney is not privileged in the technical
senses and can be obtained upon a proper showing of cause. Failure
to file objections to the interrogatiories does not waive the work pro-
duct privilege. 9 Also work product does not lose its immunity even if
disclosed to other counsel,10 if found in the possession of employees
who are not lawyers," or if the documents are from time to time in the
control of the party himself. 12 In Thompson v. Hoitsma,13 the court
said that since the purpose of this work product privilege was to pro-
tect the legal craftsman in the product of his labors, this privilege
would continue until the confidential nature of such work product is
destroyed by public use, as in court, or until the ends of justice other-
wise require its termination. A decision that seems to be contra to the
above stated general principle, is United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel
Company,14 where the court held that for the memos in question to be
entitled to the protection of the work product rule they must presently
be part of the work files of an attorney; and that since in this partcular
case the cloak of privacy had been voluntarily lifted, there was no
longer any reason to invoke the rule. This decision, however, seems to
stand alone, and the majority rule probably is that the so-called work
product privilege is not forfeited in the same manner as is material
within the attorney-client privilege.
Several other questions, unresolved by the Hickman decision, and
answered differently by the lower courts, will now be considered.
II. WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF THE WORK PRODUCT CONCEPT?
a) Does Work Product include Statements taken by Claim Agents or
Investigators for the Use of Trial Counsel?
The Hickman case dealt with a situation in which the statements
5 Shields v. Sobelman, 64 F. Supp. 619, (E.D. Pa. 1946).
6 Brush v. Harkins, 9 F.R.D. 681 (S.D. Mo. 1950); Scourtes v. Fred W.
Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
7 McCall v. Overseas Tankship Corporation, 16 F.R.D. 467 (S.D. N.Y. 1954).
8 Carpenter-Trant Drill Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp. 23 F.R.D. 257 (D.
Neb. 1959).
9 Bohlin v. Brass Rail, 20 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
10 Vilastor-Kent Theatre Corp. v. Brandt, 19 F.R.D. 522 (S.D. N.Y. 1956)
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 16 F.R.D. 5 (S.D. N.Y. 1954).
1' Fey v. Stauffer Chemical Company, 19 F.R.D. 526 (D. Neb. 1956).
12 Slifka Fabrics v. Providence Washington Insurance Company, 19 F.R.D. 374
(S.D. N.Y. 1956).13 Thompson v. Hoitsma, 19 F.R.D. 112 (D. N.J. 1956).




being sought were obtained by the trial counsel personally in anticipa-
tion of forthcoming litigation. Whether or not the rule laid down there
should be extended to cover statements obtained by others for trial
counsel's use is a question in which the decisions are in definite conflict.
In Alltmont v. United States," the court held there was no valid
distinction between statements of witnesses secured by a trial counsel
personally and those obtained by others for use of a party's trial coun-
sel. The need was said to be the same in both cases; thus the rationale
of the Hickman case required the same showing of good cause be made
for the production of statements of witnesses which were not secured
by the attorney himself. This decision has been followed in several of
the more recent cases,10 though it seems to ignore, to some extent at
least, the legal skill and training which supposedly is a requisite in
obtaining work product material, unless it can be said this skill is exer-
cised in choosing the person who is to acquire this information, or
possibly in directing his efforts.
The majority view appears to interpret the Hickman case more
strictly, and the courts following this view, rule that the fact that a
claim agent or investigator operates under general instructions of an
attorney of a party is not sufficient to constitute their work a part of
the work product of the attorney.' 7 Under these decisions, it is likewise
insufficient to bring their work within the work product concept be-
cause the investigator happens to be a lawyer s or member of a legal
department. 9 To make this material work product these courts hold the
agent must be in a basic professional relationship with his employer,
15 Alltmont v. United States, 177 F. 2d 971 (3d Cir. 1950) cert. denied, 339 U.S.
967 (1950).
10 Scourtes v. Fred XV. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio
1953); Marks v. Gas Service Company, 168 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Mo.
1958) ; Snyder v. United States, supra note 3; Hanke v. Milwaukee Electric
Ry. & Transport Co., 7 F.R.D. 540 (E.D. Wis. 1947); Thompson v. Hoitsma,
19 F.R.D. 112 (D. N.J. 1956) "statements obtained for the purpose of litiga-
tion . . . are normally inadmissable as work product if obtained by counsel
or even if obtained not by counsel but for counsel's use."
17 Thomas v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 7 F.R.D. 610 (E.D. N.Y. 1947) "I do not
agree with this effort to give this claim agent the immunity properly belong-
ing to an attorney as distinctly limited in Hickman v. Taylor; Hughes v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 7 F.R.D. 737 (E.D. N.Y. 1948). It should be noted these
latter two cases are contra to the Snyder case cited in note 16. United States
v. Certain Parcels of Land Etc., supra note 4; Szymanski v. New York, N.H.
& H.R. Co., 14 F.R.D. 82 (S.D. N.Y. 1952); Panella v. Baltimore & 0. R.
Co., 14 F.R.D. 196 (N.D. Ohio 1951) opposite Scourtes case note 16;
Durkin v. Pet Milk Co., 14 F.R.D. 385 (W.D. Ark. 1953) "Hickman case
purports to apply only to the work product of the lawyer."
IsVirginia Metal Products Corporation v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.,
10 F.R.D. 374 (S.D. N.Y. 1950) ; O'Neill v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 827 (E.D.
Pa. 1948); Newell v. Capital Transit Co., 7 F.R.D. 732 (D. D.C. 1948); Reiss
v. British General Ins. Co., 9 F.R.D. 610 (S.D. N.Y. 1949).
19 Brown v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford Railroad Company, 17 F.R.D.
324 (S.D. N.Y. 1955); Szymanski v. New York, N.H. & H.R., supra note 17.
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requiring the training, skill, and knowledge of a lawyer and the essen-
tial integrity implicit in the lawyer-client relationship.20
b) Statements of Witnesses Obtained by Trial Counsel.
It is almost universally held that statements of witnesses, taken by
counsel personally, in anticipation of litigation, are within the work
product concept. This ordinarily applies whether the statements are
written or oral, and if written, whether signed or unsigned. That this
is sound seems evident from the Hickman decision.2
In Wild v .Payson,22 a decision handed down shortly after the
Hickman case, the court held that a statement obtained by the plaintiff
himself from a witnes and then recorded verbatim in the lawyer's
office, by his stenographer, was not work product because it had not
been obtained by the attorney. The intervention of the attorney had
formed no essential step in obtaining the statement. Again in Lund-
berg v. Wells, 2 3 the court found that the statements were mere factual
accounts related by the witnesses, and could not be considered as hav-
ing been obtained as an aspect of the attorney-client relationship.
In Blanchet v. Colonial Trust Company,24 the plaintiff concealed a
tape recorded on his person and had conversations with the defendant.
The court allowed discovery of the recording, even though the plaintiff
had already given the defendant the substance of the recording by
deposition, holding it was not privileged as work product.
The requisite that the attorney's legal skill and talent be used in
gathering work product material is lacking in such cases.
c) Statements Taken in Ordinary Course of Business-Accident Re-
ports.
Most courts hold that statements gathered or taken in the ordinary
20 Connecticut 'Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, supra note 10; Lundberg v. Welles,
11 F.R.D. 136 (S.D. N.Y. 1951) "The work product of an attorney concept em-
braces matter representing work done by the attorney in his professional
capacity in the course of attorney-client relationship."
21 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 at 508 (1947) "Petitioner has made more
than an ordinary request for relevant, non-privileged facts in the possession
of his adversaries or their counsel. He has sought discovery as of right, of
oral and written statements of witnesses whose identity is well known and
whose availability to petitioner appears unimpaired." . . . at page 510 "Here
is simply an attempt, without purported necessity or justification, to secure
written statements, private memoranda and personal recollections prepared
or formed by an adverse party's counsel in the course of his legal duties. As
such, it falls outside the area of discovery and contravenes the public policy
underlying the orderly presentation and defense of legal claims. Not even the
most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquireies into the
files and mental impressions of an attorney", contra; see Scourtes v. Fred
Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio 1953) "The 'work pro-
duct' of an attorney consists only of impressions, observations and opinions
which he has recorded and transferred to his file. The written statement of a
witness, whether prepared by him and later delivered to the attorney, or
drafted by the attorney and adopted by the witness is not properly considered
the work product of an attorney."
22 Wild v. Payson, 7 F.R.D. 495 (S.D. N.Y. 1946).
23 Lundberg v. Wells, supra note 20.
24 Blanchet v. Colonial Trust Company, 23 F.R.D. 118 (D. Del. 1958).
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course of business are not included in the work product concept and
therefore freely discoverable.25 The person taking such statement must
be acting as an attorney and not something else, such as merely an
insurance adjuster.26
In Scourtes v. Fred Albrecht,27 the court held that while work done
by a third person for an attorney would be work product, reports of
accidents whether or not they include statements of persons who ulti-
mately might become witnesses, when made in the regular course of
business of a corporate party, are not made in preparation for trial
and are therefore not protected as work product. A similar situation
arises where statements are made by a party's employees in the regular
course of business or according to company rules, and not solely to aid
trial counsel. Such statements are not work product and therefore not
protected as such."'
d) Reports of Experts
Whether or not the work and conclusions of an expert, retained by
a party or his attorney, is to be classified as work product again is a
question on which ther6 is definite conflict. Some courts, following the
Alltmont rule, considered above, hold that the work performed and the
reports submitted by an expert in behalf of an attorney is protected as
work product.29 Other courts have refused discovery simply on the
25 Brown v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford Railroad Company, supra note
19; Herbst v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. Co., 10 F.R.D. 14 (S.D.
Iowa 1950) ; Bifferato v. United States Marine Corp. of Deleware, 11 F.R.D. 44(S.D. N.Y. 1951).
26 Newell v. Capital Transit Co., supra note 18; Reiss v. British General Ins. Co.,
9 F.R.D. 610 (S.D. N.Y. 1949) "It is reasonable to assume that at least some
of Bergers services were not those rendered or expected to be performed by
an attorney, but were rather work ordinaily done by an insuance adjuster
and investigator. Such acts are not protected by privilege and are not em-
braced in an attorney-client relationship, nor, can they be said to be the 'work
product' of an attorney or part of his preparation for defense of the action."
27 Scourtes v. Fred Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio 1955).
2sTower v. Southern Pafific Co., 11 F.R.D. 174 (N.D. Cal. 1951); Viront
v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., 10 F.R.D. 45 (N.D. Ohio 1950); Browner
v. Firemens Ins. Co. of Newark, New Jersey, 9 F.R.D. 609 (S.D. N.Y. 1949) ;
Portman v. American Home Products Corporation, 9 F.R.D. 613 (S.D. N.Y.
1949) ; Panella v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., supra note 17.
29 Carpenter-Trant Drill Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp., 23 F.R.D. 257 (D.
Neb. 1959) "This court, however, feels that when experts in an extremely
technical field have been retained to advice counsel in the case as to proper
technical interpretation of certain facts, and of the state of technical informa-
tion, that this partakes of the counsel's work product .... Under the rationale
of the Hickman case, it is the opinion of this court that a blanket request for
the reports which an expert has submitted to counsel in preparation of the
case for trial is a request for the attorney's work product. The court does
not believe that the attorney for one party should be entitled to the fruits
of his opponents labor in this regard without a strong showing of good cause."
Kluchenac v. Oswald & Hess Company, 20 F.R.D. 87 (W.D. Pa. 1957); Lund-
berg v. Wells, 11 F.R.D. 136 (S.D. N.Y. 1951) ; Scourtes v. Fred, supra note
27; Smith v. Washington Gas Light Co., 7 F.R.D. 735 (D. D.C. 1948);
Colden v. R. J. Schofield Motors, 14 F.R.D. 521 (N.D. Ohio 1952); Schuyler
v. United Air Lines, 10 F.R.D. 111 (M.D Pa. 1950); Sachs v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 167 F. 2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948).
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ground of public policy,30 namely, that one party should not be allowed
to take advantage of information gained through the expenditures of
the other.31 In Leding v .U.S. Rubber Co.,3 2 the court held that an
analysis made by an expert, who was engaged by the defendant, for
the benefit of counsel, was not work product; but at the same time
recognized the general policy of not allowing one party to use the fruits
of the others labor. The court said such a policy didn't apply in this
instance because the plaintiffs had hired other experts or had obligated
themselves to make their own analysis also.
In Walsh v. Reynolds,33 the court found that the report an expert
made to the attorney probably was not, in itself, work product, but
could well be considered a statement of a prospective witness, and
therefore would be work product. In this case the court also found
good cause and allowed discovery of the facts contained in the report
but held that there was no good cause present to allow discovery of
the expert conclusions contained in the report since he could get his
own expert conclusions on the facts he discovered. This same result,
allowing discovery of the factual findings only, has also been reached
in other instances where the court decided that such reports were not
work product at all.
34
In Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum of America,35 the court,
recognizing that possibly the work of an expert employed by an attor-
ney could be work product, nevertheless ordered him to answer ques-
tions on deposition on the theory he could be called as a witness and
then would have to answer anyway by direction of the court. The same
reasoning was followed in Bergstrom Paper Co. v. Continental Insur-
ance Co.,36 where it was held that opinions of expert witnesses, based
upon investigations made by them in the employ of any one of the
parties, may be the subject of discovery, one of the applicable tests
being whether or not testimony elicited upon the examination would be
properly receivable as evidence at the trial, since discovery merely
30 Lewis v. United Air Transport Corporation, 32 F. Supp. 21 (\,V.D. Pa. 1940)
Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co., 7 F.R.D. 684 (D. Mass. 1947);
Hickey v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 88 (ED. Pa. 1952) ; United States v. 6.82
Acres of Land Etc., 18 F.R.D. 195 (D. N.M. 1955).
3, Roberson v. Graham Corp., 14 F.R.D. 83 (D. Mass. 1952); Moran v. Pittsburg-
Des Moines Steel Co., 6 F.R.D. 594 (W.D. Pa. 1947) ; Boynton v. R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1941).
32 Leding v. United States Rubber Company, 23 F.R.D. 220 (D. Mont. 1959).
33 Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D. N.J. 1954).
34 United States v. Certain Parcels of Land Etc., supra note 4; Julius Hyman
& Company v. American Motorists Insurance Company, 17 F.R.D. 386 (D.
Colo. 1955) expert's investigation and report were not made at request of
counsel.
35 Cold Metal process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 425 (N.D.
Ohio 1947).
:,; Bergstrom Paper Company v. Continental Insurance Company, 7 F.R.D. 548
(E.D. Wis. 1947). In this case however, the one who engaged the expert was
not counsel but the court still used that analogy.
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advances the stage at which disclosure can be compelled. The court
also followed this reasoning as to the expert's work sheets and calcula-
tions since he might refer to these as the basis of his conclusions upon
cross-examination at the trial. However, the court found that since
there had already been extensive examination, any further examination
would be burdensome and unnecessary so further discovery was not
allowed. The opinion goes on to draw an analogy between the expert's
work and the attorney's preparation in the Hickman case and says
the requesting party here had not sustained the burden of showing
adequate reasons for a further examination of this witness.
There are other cases where the work product theory was discarded
with respect to the work of experts and discovery allowed,37 but clearly
the general rule would seem to be that the work and reports of experts
will not be discoverable without a showing of cause. It appears to make
little difference whether this rule is based on the work product theory,
which several courts have applied, or merely a general public policy
basis of not allowing a party the benefit of expenditures made by an
opponent, which at present seems to be the more widely applied basis.
e) Discovery of Defenses and Witnesses to be Used at the Trial.
It is not entirely clear whether interrogatories questioning the basis
of an affirmative defense are permissable or not. The courts seem to
draw a distinction between a request for the factual basis of the adver-
sary's position and a request for the legal theory underlying the adver-
sary's position; the former being held to be freely discoverable, while
the later is said to constitute work product material and therefore pro-
tected.
In Tobacco & Allied Stock v. Trans America, s it was held that an
interrogatory asking what evidence in the form of persons and acts
forms the basis of the defendant's affirmative defenses need not be
answered. It was there stated that these were tangible examples of an
attorney's work product as they are the attorney's mental impressions,
theories and beliefs. However, in Forsythe v. Baltimore,3" the inter-
rogatory objected to read, "State on what conduct, course of conduct,
acts of omission or commission on the part of the plaintiff you base
the allegations of contributory negligence as you set forth in your
answer ;" and the court there held such a demand did not elicit the
conclusions or work product of an attorney. It seems that the latter
case presents a sound approach, and that either party should be enti-
tled to secure information by interrogatory of acts averred as consti-
tuting negligence.4 0
37 Sacbs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F. 2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948).
3s Tobacco and Allied Stocks v. TransAmerica Corp., 16 F.R.D. 534 (D. Del.
1954).39 Forsythe v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 15 F.R.D. 191 (W.D. Pa. 1954).
40 McNeice v. Oil Carries Joint Venture, 22 F.R.D. 14 (E.D. Pa. 1958) "As
1959-1960]
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In Clemenshaw v. Beech Aircraft Corporation,;1 an interrogatory
questioning whether or not the party was relying on res ipsa loquitor,
was denied as requesting work orpduct. The court there held that only
counsel would have thought of this and only a client learned in the law
would have a knowledge of it. In B & S Halluburton Oil Well Cement-
ing Co.,4 2 the court allowed an interrogatory asking what the plaintiff
was contending and from what witnesses he had obtained the informa-
tion on which he based his contention, distinguishing it from the Cle-
menshaw case saying that the defendant was exploring contentions
regarding matters of fact, rather than legal theory, and concerning
facts that the ordinary person would understand and consider relevant
to his case.
Under Rule 26B the names and addresses of potential witnesses, as
such, are freely discoverable. However, discovery of names of wit-
nesses who gave statements, studied, or investigated the situation have
been denied where such information was equally available to both par-
ties, or the request was merely an attempt to invade the other party's
files and appropriate the attorney's work product.43 In all cases it
seems clear that where the interrogatory asks what witnesses and evi-
dence is to be used or is intended to be used at the trial, the question
need not be answered. 44 To allow this would effectively deny an attor-
ney opportunity to introduce evidence in accordance with his judgment
during the course of the trial.
I1. WHAT CONSTITUTES "GOOD CAUSE"
Under the Hickman decision work product is protected unless good
cause for discovery is shown. It's evident from an examination of the
decisions that no hard and fast rule as to what circumstances will con-
stitute good cause has evolved. Each case has to be determined upon
its particular facts, 45 and is largely within the discretion of the trial
court.46 It has been said, "A stringent standard of good cause is applied
enunciated in many decisions the party moving for discovery should be en-
titled to know upon what facts the other party is basing his allegations or
defenses." Contra-State of Md. v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 7 F.R.D. 666
(E.D. Pa. 1947).
41 Clemenshaw v Beech Aircraft Corporation, 21 F.R.D. 300 (D. Del. 1958).
42B. & S. Drilling Co. v. Halluburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 24 F.R.D. I
(S.D. Tex. 1959).
43United States v. Bennett, 14 F.R.D. 166 (E.D. Tenn. 1953) ; O'Brien %-.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, 13 F.R.D. 475 (W.D. Mo.
1953).
4- Central Hide & Rendering Co. Inc., v. B.-M.-K.- Corporation, 19 F.R.D. 294
(D. Del. 1956); Aktiebalaget Vargos v. Clark, 8 F.R.D. 635 (D. D.C. 1949);
Cogdill v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 7 F.R.D. 411 (E.D. Tenn. 1947).
-1 Hudalla v. Chicago M., S.P. & P. R.R. Co., 10 F.R.D. 363 (D. Minn. 1950);
Hanke v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Transport Co., 7 F.R.D. 540 (E.D. Wis.
1947).
416 New York Central Railroad Company v. Carr, 251 F. 2d 433 (4th Cir. 1957)
Reynolds v. United States, 192 F. 2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951) (revd. on another
ground, 345 U.S. 1 (1952) ; Marks v. Gas Service Company, 168 F. Supp. 487
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commensurate with the significance of the policy against the invasion
of an attorney's fredom in the preparation of his case.1 47 This state-
ment exemplifies the latitude in which the lower court may act in either
denying or allowing discovery.
Probably what would be the closest to a general rule would be to
say that good cause is equivalent to necessity.48 Practical difficulties in
investigating is not enough to justify discovery of information which
the adverse lawyer has in his possession.49
In Herbst v. Chicago, Rock-Island and Pacific R. Co.,50 the court
held the statements involved were not work product, but, even if they
were, good cause would still exist because an interrogation of the wit-
nesses presently, may not be identical with statements taken shortly
after the accident, also time had elapsed and memories would be
dimmed with reference to specific details, and these statements made
imediately after the accident may and undoubtedly would lead to the
discovery of material and relevant facts. The dicta in this case hasn't
been generally followed however, and good cause does not exist merely
because statements taken then and those taken now may not be the
same,5 1 or some witness may not remember what he originally said.52
Likewise good cause does not exist because a witness may be hostile
or may refuse to make a statement,5 3 nor is it sufficient to justify in-
spection of statements upon the adversary's surmise or suspicion that
he might find impeaching material therein.54 However, it has been said
(W.D. Mo. 1958); Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Pa.
1950).
47 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 16 F.R.D. 5 (S.D. N.Y. 1954);
Vilastor-Kent Theatre Corp. v. Brandt, 19 FR.D. 522 (S.D. N.Y. 1956).
48 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 at 511 (1947). "Where relevant and non-
privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and where production of
these facts is essential to the preparation of one's case, discovery may proper-
ly be had;" Helverson v. J. J. Newberry Company, 16 F.R.D. 330 (W.D.
Mo. 1954) ; Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, supra note 47; Walsh
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D. N.J. 1954); Alltmont v. United
States, 177 F. 2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949) (cert. denied 339 U.S. 967, 1950) ; Wilson
v. Capital Airlines, 19 F.R.D. 263 (E.D. N.C. 1956).
-9 United States v. Deere & Co., 9 F.R.D. 523 (D. Minn. 1949) ; Tandy & Allen
Construction Co. v. Peerless Casualty Co., 20 F.R.D. 223 (S.D. N.Y. 1957);
These cases seem to indicate however, if the disparity in opportunty of inves-
tigation is great enough, discovery may be allowed.5 0 Herbst v. Chicago, Rock-Island & Pacific R. Co., 10 F.R.D. 14 (S.D. Iowa,
1950).
5 Helverson v. J. J. Newberry Company, supra note 48. The court here in
denying discovery, found that maybe the one taking the statements wasn't a
lawyer but said it didn't matter; evidently meaning there wasn't even suffi-
cient cause to satisfy Rule 34 without the added burden of the Hickman rule.
52 United States v. Deere & Co., supra note 49.
53 Ibid. Tandy & Allen Construction Co. v. Peerless Casualty Co., supra, note 49.
Portman v. American Home Products Corporation, 9 F.R.D. 613 (S.D. N.Y.
1949); Hanke v. Milwaukee Electric Railway and Transport Company, 7
F.R.D. 540 (E.D. Wis. 1947).
54Hudalla v. Chicago, M., S.P. & P. R. Co., 10 F.R.D. 363 (D. Minn. 1950);
Hauger v .Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co, 216 F. 2d 501 (7th
Cir. 1954) "A court is not justified in ordering a litigant to permit his adver-
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that if the witnesses deny the purport of their alleged statements the
work product privilege would cease to be effective. 55 In all these situa-
tions it has been held that if after diligent effort the party could not
obtain the statements, he could again apply to the court for assistance, 51
or if the petitioner can show that he has reasonable grounds to believe
that impeaching material is in fact contained in the statements it may
be reached.5
The circumstances, alleged as constituting good cause, must always
be shown by the petitioner, and the court will not find it from a party's
mere allegation thereof.58
Inequality of facilities of investigation is not enough to have dis-
covery of work product ordered, nor is hardship of investigation,
financial, or otherwise such as difficulty in finding the witnesses."'
As was said in the Hickman case, production might be justified
where the witnesses are no longer available.60 This has not been con-
strued to include absence from the state by a witness. Such a witness
is not unavailable within the rule, and his absence is not good cause for
production of work product statements.6 1 In M'IcCall v. Overseas Tank-
ship Corporation,6 2 all the passengers aboard a plane were killed, thus
rendering it impossible to produce the testimony of anyone who wit-
nessed the crash or the operation of the plane. The court held this to
be sufficient cause for the production, inspection, and taking of testi-
mony as to the attorney's professional activities in gathering informa-
tion of the surrounding circumstances.
The good cause present in unavailability of the witness has been
extended by analogy to unavailability of the evidence in its original
state. In Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co.,6 3 a propane heater exploded
sary to inspect witness statements, which he has procured in preparing for
trial, upon the adversary's mere surmise or suspicion that he might find im-
peaching material in the statements. In such a situation the rights of a litigant
in the work-product of his lawyers and agents are not required to give way
to an adversary's right of discovery. At 508. Burns v. Mulder, 20 F.R.D.
605 (E.D. Pa. 1957) ; Carpenter-Trant Drill Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp.,
23 F.R.D. 257 (D. Neb. 1959).
55 Thompson v. Hoitsma, 19 F.R.D. 112 (D. N.J. 1956).
56 Tandy & Allen Construction Co. v. Peerless Casualty Co., supra note 49. Port-
man v. American Home Products Corporation, supra note 53.
57 United States v. Great Northern Railway Company, 18 F.R.D. 357 (N.D. Cal.
S.D. 1955).
5s Ibid. Tandy & Allen Construction Co. v. Peerless Casualty Co. supra note 49
Martin v. Capital Transit Co. 170 F. 2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1948) ; Carpenter-
Trant Drill Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp., supra note 54.
55 Portman v. American Home Products Corporation, supra note 53; United
States v. Deere & Co., 9 F.R.D. 523 (D. Minn. 1949) ; Lester v. Isbrandtsen
Co., 10 F.R.D. 338 (S.D. Tex., 1950).Go Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 at 511, (1947).
G1 Tandy & Allen Construction Co. v. Peerless Casualty Co., supra note 49; Les-
ter v. Isbrandtsen Co., supra note 59; Berger v. Central Vermona Ry. Inc., 8
F.R.D. 419 (D. Mass. 1948).
G2 McCall v. Overseas Tankship Corporation, 16 F.R.D. 467 (S.D. N.Y. 1954).
C3 Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D. N.J. 1954).
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killing the plaintiff's intestate. An inspection by defendant's experts
and plumbers ensued, during which the equipment was disconnected,
and some of it removed by the plumbers and then returned. The court
held that under such circumstances the best evidence of the condition
in which this equipment was right after the explosion was the notes
made of such condition by the expert and incorporated into his report,
vhich was the subject of the motion. Thus they said the "necessity" or
"justification" existed to obtain discovery of the otherwise protected
work product of the lawyer. The same result was reached in Colden
v. R. J. Schofield Motors,6 4  in which the automobile involved had
been disassembled during the course of the investigation and examina-
tion, upon which the expert's statement was based. This latter case is
also of interest on another point. The rule is stated in the Hickman
case and often times repeated that discovery of an attorney's files will
not be allowed where the information sought is available elsewhere or
through other means.6 Here however, it was held that even though
possibly the information might be secured by taking the depostition of
the expert, in the interest of time and the expedition of the litigation,
the statement or a true copy thereof should be produced and furnished
the requesting party.
Marks v. Gas Service Company,66 is one of the more liberal cases
in finding good cause. The plaintiff's house had burned as a result of a
leak in the defendant's gas pipe. The defendant had an investigation
made and a written report was given to counsel. The court concluded
that the complexity of the subject, the immediacy of the tests after the
fire, the technical nature of the report, and the length of time elapsed
since the investigation all combined to make it difficult if not impossible
for the plaintiff to obtain the facts involved without recourse to the
report; and discovery of this work product was allowed. However,
none of the decisions upon which the court relied, in the above case,
as supporting its position, and from which the court quoted, involved
work product. The cited decisions all made it clear that, for various
reasons, they were not dealing with work product.
In all of the above considerations the courts have been, in general,
dealing with written material. Under the Hickman v. Taylor decision
the cause for discovery of oral statements and mental impressions must
be greater than that required when the request is for written state-
ments.67 No case has been found in which a court held that the excep-
64 Colden v. R. J. Schofield Motors, 14 F.R.D. 521 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
65 State of Maryland v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 7 F.R.D. 666 (E.D. Pa. 1947);
Tandy & Allen Construction Co. v. Peerless Casualty Co., supra note 49;
Helverson v. J. J. Newberry Company, supra note 48.
66 Marks v. Gas Service Company, 168 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Mo. 1958).
67 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) at 512, "Rule 30(b) as presently
written, gives the trial judge the requisite discretion to make a judgment
as to whether discovery should be allowed as to written statements secured
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tional circumstances or rare situation has existed, as required by the
Hickman case, which would justify the production of mental impres-
sions or oral statements.
The Hickman rule places upon a party, who attempts to invade the
privacy of the opposing attorney's trial preparation, the burden of
showing good cause. This is true whether discovery is sought under
Rule 26, 33 or 34. Rule 34 by its own terms requires good cause be
shown, but it is generally held that when work product material is
sought under this rule the Hickman case places an additional burden
on the proponent of production."
IV. CONCLUSION
While the Hickman v. Taylor has provided a fairly workable rule,
there is much conflict in the lower courts due to its liberal interpreta-
tion by some and a strict interpretation by others. This conflict results
from the attempt to strike a balance between full disclosure in the
interests of justice, on the one hand, and the maintenance of the adver-
sary character of law suits on the other. Though the scope of discovery
is broad under the Federal Rules it would seem that the strict interpre-
tation is the sounder one. As Justice Jackson aptly stated :69
But a common law trial is and always should be an adversary
proceeding. Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned
profession to perform its functions either without wits or on
wits borrowed from the adversary.
JAmES L. STEIMEL
from witnesses. But in the instant case there was no room for that discretion
to operate in favor of the petitioner. No attempt was made to establish any
reason why Fortenbaugh should be forced to produce the written statements.
There was only a naked, general demand for these materials as of right and
a finding by the District Court that no recognizable privilege was involved.
That was insufficient to justify discovery under these crcumstances and the
court should have sustained the refusal of the tug owners and Fortenbaugh
to produce.
"But as to oral statements made by witnesses to Fortenbaugh, whether in
the form of his mental impressions or memoranda, we do not believe that any
showing of necessity can be made under the circumstances of this case so as
to justify production. . . . If there should be a rare situation justifying pro-
duction of these matters, petitioners case is not of that type."
6s Marks v. Gas Service Company, 168 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Mo. 1958) ; Brauner
v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1956). Justice Jackson stated
in the concurring opinion of the Hickman case that the production of signed
written statements was governed by Rule 34 and upon a showing of good
cause therefore the court could order their inspection, copying or photograph-
ing. This appears to be opposite the generally accepted rule of the Hickman
case.
G9 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 at 516 (1947).
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